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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PRIMARY
PUBLIC SECURITIES MARKETS
HAL S. SCOTT*
I
INTRODUCTION
In fully internationalized securities markets, issuers in public primary mar-
kets should be able to issue securities to investors worldwide using one set of
optimal distribution procedures and disclosure documents, and subject to one
set of liability standards and enforcement remedies.  Rules in which the benefits
outweigh the costs are optimal.  Optimal standardized issuance (“OSI”) across
borders would reduce the costs of issuing securities that are in international
demand, a benefit that would be shared by both issuers and investors.  Also,
OSI would result in more perfect competition in the issuing market for such se-
curities (just as in the goods market) and a more efficient allocation of capital
worldwide.  OSI is only relevant when there is sufficient investor demand for a
public international distribution.  This article is concerned only with those cases.
The significant growth of registered offerings of foreign issuers in the United
States, from seventy-eight in 1990 to 526 (with a total value of $145.9 billion) in
1998, is a strong indication of such investor demand.1
This article focuses on public primary markets rather than public secondary
markets.  While the two markets are related—publicly distributed securities are
invariably listed and traded in public secondary markets—they are not the
same.  Public securities are initially distributed through an underwriting process
where securities are sold to investors by the issuer through underwriters; there-
after, the securities are traded in the secondary market.  Primary market distri-
butions play a crucial part in the allocation of capital.  Investors purchasing in
primary markets, as opposed to secondary markets, cannot necessarily rely on
prices set in deep liquid markets where rational expectations of the value of the
securities have been incorporated into the price.2  Additionally, public primary
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1. See 1 EDWARD GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS § 1-1 (5th ed. 2000).
2. In arguing for a “market” approach to international securities regulation, Roberta Romano has
advocated a system where the governing rules for a foreign issuer in U.S. markets would be the laws of
the issuer’s country of incorporation.  Romano contends that such a regime would encourage foreign
firms to list on U.S. exchanges.  This, in turn, would have the effect of reducing the transaction costs
facing the U.S. investor who wished to purchase foreign securities as they would be able to purchase
them directly in the U.S. markets without having to incur the costs involved in purchasing shares on a
foreign exchange.  See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
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markets involve purchases by individual investors; indeed, issuers make such
distributions in order to reach these investors.  While initial public offerings
(“IPO”s)—an important part of the public primary market—are heavily domi-
nated by institutional investors, individual investors participate significantly in
these markets, as well.
This article assumes that there is no conflict between having standardized
and optimal disclosure rules.  Merritt Fox, to justify his issuer nationality ap-
proach, argues to the contrary when he raises the possibility that the socially op-
timal level of disclosure may differ for different countries.3  He argues, in effect,
that the optimal level of disclosure in Germany and Japan, where capital has
been traditionally allocated mainly through banking markets, may be lower
than in the United States, where securities markets have played a more impor-
tant role.4  However, in major markets, including Germany and Japan, securities
markets currently play an important enough role that those countries care
about how they allocate capital.  Securities markets in these countries, as com-
pared to banking markets, are gaining importance.  Further, even if one should
be more tolerant of less disclosure in Germany, such a rule would only affect
allocation of capital within Germany.  Such tolerance would not be appropriate
in an international context where the concern is with allocation among issuers
of different countries.  If Deutsche Telekom raises significant capital outside
Germany, we should be concerned with choosing the right set of rules for the
world, not just Germany.
Part II of this article discusses the current obstacles to achieving OSI.  It ar-
gues that the imposition of U.S. rules for disclosure, distribution, and enforce-
ment, within and to some extent outside the United States, impedes the
achievement of OSI.  It also argues that the solution is not merely to abolish
mandated disclosure.  The article then proceeds to examine options for dealing
with the problem.  Parts III and IV, respectively, examine and then reject har-
monization and various versions of mutual recognition as solutions.  Part V ex-
amines the structure of U.S. Regulation S and restrictions on use of the Inter-
net.  Part VI proposes that relaxation of these rules can substantially contribute
to establishing OSI for the issuance of foreign securities.  Part VII is a conclu-
sion.
II
THE OPTIMALITY OF U.S. DISCLOSURE RULES
Currently, OSI is not achievable in public securities markets, largely because
the United States conditions issuance in its territory—and to some significant
extent to U.S. investors outside its territory—on compliance with its unique set
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2418-20 (1998).  Romano’s argument is basically aimed at the secon-
dary, rather than the primary, market.
3. See Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Glob-
alizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 757 (1998).
4. See id. at 760.
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of distribution procedures, disclosure documents, and enforcement rules.  It is
well known that this practice has deterred primary issuers from distributing se-
curities in U.S. markets and to U.S. investors.  Standardized issuance (“SI”) can
be achieved if issuers are willing to abide by U.S. rules, because these rules are
tougher in most material respects than those in other jurisdictions.  But it is un-
likely that these rules are optimal.  Because the United States is the predomi-
nant source of worldwide capital, U.S. rules have either substantially fraction-
ated international public securities markets by precluding U.S. issues, or
resulted in non-optimal standardized distributions.
A. The Market Test of Optimality
The fact that the international unregulated private placement market does
not always demand U.S. public market documentation reveals that the level of
disclosure required by the United States is not optimal.  Instead, the interna-
tional market generally has adopted what market participants call “interna-
tional” documentation or rules, developed by issuers, underwriters, and institu-
tional investors.5  The United States justifies its more complicated disclosure
rules by claiming that they are for the benefit or protection of the less sophisti-
cated investor.  It is unlikely, however, that relatively unsophisticated individual
investors can make use of more or different information than sophisticated in-
vestors; indeed, because of their lack of sophistication, they can make less use
of such information.  To the extent that the rationale for disclosure levels is the
desirability of accurate market prices, sophisticated investors have just as much
incentive, and probably more, in having such accuracy.
It is more plausible to argue that individual investors need to have informa-
tion presented to them in a different manner than do sophisticated investors.
This idea is central to the SEC’s advancement of the “Plain English” require-
ment.6  Sophisticated investors, it is argued, do not need to have things spelled
out because they bring more background to their reading.  Yet this argument is
faulty as well, because most individual investors do not read prospectuses; the
information in the prospectuses is predigested for them by analysts or advisors.
Those who do read prospectuses are likely to be fairly sophisticated, even if
they would not qualify as private placement investors.7  In any event, distin-
guishing between style and substance, we can use the substance of disclosure in
the private market as a benchmark.  It is important to emphasize that private
market disclosure standards arise out of commercial practice and not law.  In-
5. Emails from Edward F. Greene, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, to Hal S. Scott
(Aug. 16, 1999 and Sept. 1, 1999) (on file with author).
6. Plain English Disclosure, Security Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act Release No. 39,593, 63
Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998).
7. The claimed virtues of the Plain English approach have not gone unchallenged.  See Kenneth
B. Firtel, Note, Plain English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 890 (1998) (noting that the theory underlying the “plain Eng-
lish” regulation involves risks to both the unsophisticated investor and the financial professional owing
to the fact that “[i]f an issuer attempts to use simple words to explain complex concepts, then inevitably
something will be left out”).
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deed, one cannot go anywhere to look them up—probably the best one could
do is to reverse engineer the rules from the actual forms lawyers use to create
their documentation.
Further research is necessary to determine how closely the international
standard matches existing U.S. rules for public offerings.  One clear difference
does exist: There is no U.S. GAAP reconciliation under the international stan-
dard.  If the United States were to accept the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee (“IASC”) standards as an alternative to U.S. standards, as
now seems quite probable, this difference may become immaterial.  Apart from
accounting, it appears that the international standard may be quite close to U.S.
rules for some offerings, particularly IPOs.  But for secondary offerings8 of
widely traded companies—which regularly report material information to the
market—there may be a significant difference between international standards
and U.S. rules.  For example, in a recent private equity offering for Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank, documentation was minimal because the market believed it
already had enough information.  If private market disclosure based on actual
practices is used as a basis for determining the adequacy of public disclosure,
the level of required disclosure would depend on various characteristics of the
issue—for example, debt versus equity, IPO versus secondary, and big versus
small—as well as the nature of the issuer—for example, reporting versus non-
reporting and regulated (for example, banks) versus non-regulated.
The solution to different distribution and enforcement rules is much less
clear.  It is entirely rational to have different distribution rules for institutional
and individual investors.  For example, one may have legitimate concerns that
individual investors could be more influenced than institutional investors to buy
securities based on underwriter research reports disseminated during the distri-
bution period.  It also may be entirely rational to have different enforcement
rules for public and private markets.  For example, the feasibility of enforce-
ment by individuals in public markets may depend on the prospect of damages
in a class action suit, while in private markets, the necessity of repeat dealings
may adequately deter violations.9  Unfortunately, there is no reliable private
market for distribution rules or enforcement to use as a benchmark for the op-
timality of rules.
An issuer can generally deal with diverse national distribution requirements
in three ways: (1) abstain entirely from issuing in the U.S. market; (2) distribute
in foreign markets under foreign rules and in the U.S. market under U.S. rules,
which might result in the distribution being later in the United States than
abroad; or (3) refrain from issuing marketing materials, other than a U.S.-
compliant prospectus, in any market until the registration statement is effective
in the United States.  Option 1 clearly results in segmented markets, as no secu-
rities are issued in the United States.  Option 2 also results in segmentation, be-
8. When I use the term secondary offering in this article, I mean any offering that is not an IPO—
that is, any additional issue of securities by the issuer.
9. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159-86 (1994).
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cause price competition introduced by U.S. distributions is not available during
earlier distributions in other countries.  Option 3 achieves a standardized distri-
bution, but at the cost of deferring the distribution until the U.S. effective regis-
tration date.  Option 3 could increase investor cost if deferred marketing in-
creases issuer distribution cost, and may not be justified if it decreases investor
welfare overall.  This is a general problem with any system of mandated harmo-
nized rules, as discussed in Part III below.
The SEC is largely responsible for engineering the current state of affairs.  It
has acted from the best of motives—the protection of U.S. investors.  It seeks
generally to ensure that investors are well-informed before making investment
decisions and believes that rigorous disclosure is necessary to protect the repu-
tation of U.S. capital markets.  The SEC believes in the virtues of standardized
primary issuance markets, but insists that U.S. law set the standard.
In my view, the SEC has pursued a limited vision of investor welfare.  In the
desire to protect individual investors (visions of widows and orphans spring to
mind), the SEC may have sacrificed investor welfare as a whole.  While some
number of investors may make better investment decisions as a result of SEC
rules, investor welfare as a whole is decreased by the inability to achieve stan-
dardized rules.  Lack of standardization imposes higher costs on issuers, which
are passed on to investors through higher prices for capital.  As in other areas of
consumer protection, the benefits to particular consumers should be weighed
against the costs to consumers as a whole.
B. Claims That Disclosure is Unimportant to Investor Welfare
Some authors have taken the extreme view that investor welfare is largely
unaffected by the level of disclosure.  They argue that investors will take the
level of disclosure into account when purchasing securities.  Investors will dis-
count the price of securities for lack of disclosure because securities with less
disclosure will be more risky than those with more disclosure.10  This argument
is entirely unconvincing, particularly in primary markets.  First, there is gener-
ally no way for an investor, sophisticated or otherwise, to know that he is miss-
ing information and to attach an appropriate discount to that risk.11  For exam-
ple, an investor has no way of knowing that an issuer failed to disclose material
10. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 906 (1998) (arguing that “[i]nvestors . . . will dis-
count the price they are willing to pay for securities based on the regime under which the securities are
issued or traded”); Fox, supra note 3, at 732 n.86 (arguing that “each investor will receive the same risk-
adjusted expected rate of return whatever issuer’s shares she purchases, whether the issuer discloses at
a high level or a low one” if share prices equal the present value of their future income stream and in-
vestors have a worldwide set of issuers to choose from); Romano, supra note 2, at 2366-67 (arguing that
issuers “will bear the cost of operating under a legal regime inimical to investor interests, and they will
therefore select the regime that maximizes the joint welfare of promoters and investors”).
11. Also, as Joel Trachtman points out in Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in
International Securities Regulation 15-16 (Sept. 22, 1999) (Working Paper, on file with author), under
the Tiebout model for regulatory competition, investors must be fully informed about the securities
laws of all jurisdictions, a condition which obviously cannot be fulfilled in the case of individual inves-
tors.
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information, such as a design flaw.12  Even if the investor knows that the issuer
failed to disclose a particular type of information, such as segmented line of
business information, the investor does not know that this means the issuer is
more risky.  The issuer may have chosen not to disclose such information be-
cause disclosure would aid competitors, rather than because it would show that
its earnings were undiversified.  One could try to finesse this basic problem by
arguing that the price of a security reflects whatever judgments, however imper-
fect, the market makes about the adequacy of disclosure.  So while the dis-
counting may not be perfect—no discount ever is—it does occur.
Second, the discounting argument only works if a market generally has ade-
quate disclosure, and that the price of an individual security based on inade-
quate disclosure can be discounted; that is, that there is a market baseline
against which to measure the discount.  However, if the market provides gener-
ally inadequate information, such discounting becomes impossible.  In addition,
whatever persuasiveness this argument may have in secondary markets, it fails
in primary markets because the price of the security is not generally set by the
market, but by the issuer and the underwriter.  Furthermore, the discounting
argument ignores the impact of such discounts on the capital formation process.
Due to the riskiness of markets without optimal disclosure rules, there will be
underinvestment in such markets.13  At the macro level, worthwhile projects
may go without funding; at the micro level, investor preferences for security in-
vestments with less risk will go unsatisfied.  In theory, markets suffering from
underinvestment due to sub-optimal disclosure should, in the long term, in-
crease disclosure requirements.  But increasing disclosure requirements leaves
no protection for investors in the short term.  Moreover, countries may fail to
adopt optimal disclosure rules because of regulatory capture by influential issu-
ers or inadequate resources.
Third, these discounting arguments ignore the problem of over-disclosure.
As argued above, if issuers are required to disclose information where the costs
of providing the information exceed the benefits to investors, investor welfare is
decreased.  Investors cannot avoid this problem by simply refusing to buy stocks
issued in markets demanding too much disclosure if such markets are sizable,
12. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel rejected the inability to discount as grounds for
mandating disclosure, stating  that “[o]nce the firm starts disclosing it cannot stop short of making any
critical revelation, because investors always assume the worst.  It must disclose the bad with the good,
lest investors assume that the bad is even worse than it is.”  Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fis-
chel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV 669, 683 (1984).  This is non-
sense.  Will investors assume that cars will self-destruct just because a manufacturer has not revealed a
design flaw that investors have no reason to believe exists?  I agree, however, with the authors that
third-party effects might deter disclosure by issuers of information they might readily agree to provide
if such disclosure were mandated for everyone.
13. Lack of reliable information is already a classic problem in developing markets and one that
accounts for underinvestment.
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like those of the United States, and attractive on dimensions other than disclo-
sure.14
A cousin of the discounting argument is the contention that the level of dis-
closure does not matter to investors who have diversified portfolios.  As with
the discount argument, this contention has very limited applicability to the pri-
mary market, as diversified portfolios would not usually contain new issues
(particularly not IPOs).  Further, there are basic problems with the diversifica-
tion argument even for the secondary market.
The term “diversification” in this context is not very clear.  The conven-
tional notion of a portfolio diversified for the risks of a specific issuer—for ex-
ample by type of business and country of operations—requires disclosure to ob-
tain the information necessary to diversify if one is picking stocks (as opposed
to buying index funds).  In constructing a diversified portfolio, one seeks lack of
co-variation in the price of the securities.  This could be done mechanically
based only on some period of past price performance, without knowing any-
thing about the issuers of securities.  But as we know, past is not always, and
perhaps not even usually, prologue.  Suppose, for example, that some industries
had fixed the Y2K problem and others had not and could not.  The past per-
formance and co-variation of the non-compliant industries would not be a reli-
able predictor of future performance.  Investors need current information in
order to diversify intelligently.
Accurate pricing of portfolios affects the attractiveness of holding invest-
ments, whether an index fund or an actual portfolio of all stocks (assuming no
budget constraint).  Even if the portfolio is perfectly diversified, investors still
have a substantial interest in the value of the portfolio, and the price of the
portfolio will certainly be affected by the adequacy of disclosure.  Indeed, if in-
vestors believe that stocks—or the index funds composed of such stocks—are
more risky because of lack of disclosure, they will hold less stock and more of
some other financial asset.  This is not optimal from the investor’s point of view,
however, because he would prefer to hold more stocks if disclosure were more
optimal.
There could be another notion of a diversified portfolio with respect to the
level of disclosure applicable to particular securities.  The claim would be that
disclosure is not important if one owns a portfolio of securities diversified with
respect to the disclosure rules themselves.  But holding a portfolio diversified as
to disclosure rules does not, as is the case with specific performance risk, diver-
sify the investor out of the risk of non-disclosure.  The theory of diversification
with respect to risk is based on constructing a portfolio in which the perform-
ance of the securities is imperfectly (if possible, even negatively) correlated.
One cannot ensure that the actual valuation of securities under different disclo-
14. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200,
1233-1237 (1999) [hereinafter Cox, Regulatory Duopoly] (formulating his own excellent critique of reli-
ance on the discounting mechanism).
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sure regimes is imperfectly correlated, because the value of securities is deter-
mined by the performance of the firms, not disclosure rules.
Finally, even if the discounting mechanism worked perfectly to compensate
investors and penalize issuers for inadequate disclosure, the lack of disclosure
would still result in the imperfect allocation of capital.  That is, optimal levels of
disclosure help to ensure that capital finds its most productive use.
This article next explores three alternatives for possibly dealing with the
need for OSI: (1) harmonization, under which countries of the world agree on a
common set of rules, whether U.S. rules as the SEC would have it, or some
other set of rules; (2) mutual recognition, under which participating countries
defer to the validity in their territory of the rules of other countries, along the
lines adopted in the European Union, and to a limited degree under the U.S.-
Canadian Multijurisdictional Disclosure Statement (“MJDS”) regime; and (3)
off-shore free zones, where issuers are free to issue securities to investors from
any country under one set of rules.  It concludes that off-shore free zones are
the best and most realistic alternative.
III
HARMONIZATION
Under the harmonization alternative, every nation in the world would adopt
one set of rules for the primary issuance of securities.  Efforts along these lines
are already well under way.  The International Organization of Securities
Commissioners (“IOSCO”) has formulated a set of disclosure rules15 and the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”) has promulgated inter-
national accounting rules.16  However, there are several problems with this har-
monizing effort.  The major problem is that there is no reason to assume that
the world’s regulators would choose an optimal level of disclosure, even if they
could agree on a single disclosure standard, particularly since the United States
is likely to insist that world standards be close to its own, a standard that may be
far from optimal.  Indeed, harmonization of disclosure rules at a non-optimal
level could make investors worse off, since optimal rules in some markets—for
example, possibly the United Kingdom—would be replaced by non-optimal
harmonized rules.  Unlike the situation today, one would not have the choice of
avoiding U.S. type public distribution rules just by foregoing a public U.S. dis-
tribution.  There are other problems as well.
First, it is highly doubtful that international agreement can be achieved.
IOSCO has been able to reach agreement on some basic disclosure issues where
there are few national differences and the basic rules are consistent with current
15. See INTERNATIONAL ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
FOR CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND INITIAL LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS (1998).
16. See generally INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM., INTERNATIONAL
DISCUSSION PAPER: SHAPING IASC FOR THE FUTURE (1998).  The need for foreign issuers to comply
with U.S. accounting rules in order to access the U.S. market (GAAP reconciliation) has been a sub-
stantial deterrent to entering the U.S. market.
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U.S. practice—such as requirements to identify directors, senior management,
and advisers or to provide key information about the company’s financial posi-
tion.  However, IOSCO has been unable to reach agreement in other areas
where the difference between nations is significant, such as the need for seg-
mented market reporting, the permissibility of making forecasts or projections,
and the permissibility of director indemnification.  In September 1999, the SEC
adopted changes, effective September 2000, to its non-financial statement dis-
closure requirements to conform more closely to the International Disclosure
Standards endorsed by IOSCO in September 1998.17  The Standards, however,
only cover the fundamental disclosure topics discussed above and not the more
contentious areas.  The SEC trumpeted the adoption of the IOSCO rules as the
equivalent of an “international passport” that will gain issuers access to U.S.
markets.18  At the same time, one law firm, commenting on the adoption at the
proposal stage, said that the passport holder will still need a U.S. visa that is
costly and time-consuming to obtain.19
Second, no effort has been made to date to achieve standardization with re-
spect to the more difficult area of distribution procedures and enforcement.
Even assuming that every country agreed to harmonize disclosure documents,
primary markets would still be segmented.  For example, in the United States,
an issuer (or underwriter or dealer) cannot generally distribute marketing ma-
terials, other than those contained in a “prospectus,” before a registration
statement becomes effective.20  Other countries do not have the same require-
ment.  There is no current prospect for harmonizing distribution rules.
Likewise, no effort has been made to achieve standardization with respect to
enforcement.  Standardized enforcement would require countries to have simi-
lar enforcement remedies, both administrative and private, and to apply such
remedies with similar effectiveness.  Lack of standardized enforcement can also
lead to segmented markets or increased distribution costs.  A significant num-
ber of foreign issuers have reportedly avoided U.S. public markets because of
the stiff enforcement remedies employed by the SEC—including potential
criminal liability—and the prospect of costly private class action suits.21  The
lack of effort to standardize distribution procedures and enforcement reflects
the extreme difficulty of achieving consensus as to what the standards should
be.
A third problem with harmonization involves the necessity of interpreting or
updating agreements in a timely fashion.  This has been a significant issue in
17. See International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 41,936, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,900 (Oct 5, 1999).
18. Id.
19. See Comment from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (last visited Apr. 12, 1999), <http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7399/sulliva1.
htm>.
20. See JAMES COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 276-99 (2d ed.
1997) [hereinafter SECURITIES REGULATION].
21. See Howell Jackson and Eric Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets:
Evidence from Europe in 1999, 50 (2000) (preliminary draft on file with author).
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IASC’s work on the promulgation of international accounting standards.  Work
on the basic twelve standards was completed in December 1998.  The standards
have already been accepted by the London Stock Exchange and almost all
other European exchanges.  However, the SEC and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (“FASB”) have balked at allowing their use in the United
States until agreement on a future governance system for interpreting and up-
dating such standards is achieved.22  While such agreement is now on the hori-
zon, a governance structure for disclosure standards, not to mention distribu-
tion and enforcement standards, would be much more daunting.  It is hard to
envision IOSCO performing this function, due to its diverse membership
(members come from ninety-seven jurisdictions), and the reluctance of national
sovereigns to delegate such sensitive matters to an international organization.
Even if a forum could be devised to take charge of harmonized rules, the seri-
ous question of whether one would want to entrust any international body with
that kind of authority would remain; this would raise the specter of the Uber-
regulator.23
A fourth problem with harmonization is that it can stifle innovation.  An
important source of regulatory reform and change is competition among na-
tional authorities and the possibility of escaping national regulation (to some
extent) by engaging in offshore transactions.  It would be better to achieve
standardization for particular issues of public securities without requiring that
all issues of securities abide by the same rules, particularly when, as argued
above, harmonized rules are likely to be non-optimal.
IV
MUTUAL RECOGNITION
Mutual recognition is a system in which host countries recognize the validity
of using other countries’ rules to issue securities in the territory of the host
countries.  For example, under the MJDS regime adopted in 1991,24 the United
States permits Canadian companies to issue securities in the United States un-
der Canadian rules, and Canada permits U.S. companies to issue securities in
Canada under U.S. rules, albeit with some very important exceptions.25  Addi-
tionally, the European Union permits firms in one member state (the home
22. See Michael Peel, Accord Puts Common World Standards Drive Back on Track, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1999, at 14; Lucinda Kemeny, Global Watchdog Under Threat, ACCT. AGE, Oct. 7, 1999, at 5.
23. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World’s Securities Markets: Economic
Causes and Regulatory Consequences (Stanford Law & Economics Working Paper, 1990).  More re-
cently, Uri Geiger has suggested the creation of a “Global Coordinator” to implement harmonized
rules.  See Uri Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market: A Proposal,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1800-05 (1998).
24. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting
System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, Exchange Act Release No. 29,354, Trust
Indenture Act Release No. 2267, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter MJDS].
25. In 1999, Canadian firms accounted for 38% of the 1116 international offerings in the United
States.  See Stephen Handelman, Newly Limited Partnership; Canada Could Lose Its Special Status in
U.S. Capital Markets, TIME, Dec. 13, 1999, at 29.
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state) to issue securities throughout the Union (within host states), under home
state rules.  However, neither of these arrangements has been totally satisfac-
tory.
A. MJDS
The MJDS regime is limited in a number of ways.  Because it only covers
equity and investment-grade debt of companies with over $75 million in public
float, it is not available for IPOs.  Also, for issuance in the United States, the is-
suer must be a Canadian company (incorporated in Canada) or a “foreign pri-
vate issuer” (or Crown corporation).  A foreign private issuer is defined in Rule
3b-4 of the Exchange Act and Rule 405 of the Securities Act to include all for-
eign issuers other than: (1) foreign governments; and (2) foreign issuers that
have: (a) more than fifty percent of their outstanding voting securities directly
or indirectly owned of record by residents of the United States; and (b) U.S.
citizens or residents making up a majority of their executive officers and direc-
tors, more than fifty percent of their assets located in the United States, or their
business administered principally in the United States.26
Only real Canadian companies are permitted to use MJDS.  Technically,
however, a company whose operations and management were entirely based in
Nigeria could, if it was incorporated in Canada (assuming such incorporation
were permitted under Canadian law), meet the requirements of Canadian in-
corporation for a foreign private issuer.  Despite this technicality, there does
not seem to be a case of the use of Canadian rules by companies based outside
Canada, and it is highly likely that U.S. and Canadian securities officials would
prevent this from happening.27
While the MJDS generally permits qualified issuers to use Canadian disclo-
sure rules, certain important exceptions are made: financial statements must be
reconciled to U.S. GAAP, auditors must be independent according to U.S.
standards, documents must be in English (they are in French in Quebec), and
there must be disclosure on indemnification provisions regarding directors, offi-
cers, and controlling persons (Canadian law does not require this).
More basically, the MJDS only deals with disclosure standards; it does not
cover distribution rules or liability.  For example, U.S. requirements on delivery
of the prospectus, safe harbor provisions on advertisements, and rules on the
publication of opinions and recommendations still apply.  In addition, U.S. li-
ability rules for public issues, most importantly Sections 11 and 13 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and Rule 10b-5 under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
still apply with one important exception.  A registration statement will not be
considered misleading or fraudulent simply because it does not contain infor-
mation required by U.S. rules.  As long as an issuer complies with Canadian
standards (subject to the exceptions noted above), as construed by Canadian
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2000).
27. Telephone conversation with Craig Broad, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (Jan. 25, 2000).
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authorities, the issuer is in compliance with U.S. law.28 It is important to note
that public enforcement of Canadian standards in connection with U.S. issues
has been effectively delegated to Canada.  Only Canadian authorities review
the Canadian registration statements used in the United States.
The SEC has been reported to be considering the elimination of the MJDS,
apparently out of concern that Canadian disclosure standards, and particularly
the enforcement of those standards by Canadian authorities, are not as rigorous
as those of the United States.29  The SEC, however, is apparently going to justify
the change on the grounds that special bilateral disclosure arrangements were
inconsistent with the need for uniform rules for foreign issuers.30
B. European Union and Mutual Recognition
As part of the objective of creating a single market within its states, the
European Union permits an issuer to offer its securities on an E.U.-wide basis,
subject only to the disclosure rules of its home state and compliance with cer-
tain minimum E.U. standards.  Thus, for example, a French company could of-
fer its securities throughout the European Union, which comprises Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
For securities on exchanges, the Listings Particulars Directive applies, and for
public offerings of unlisted securities, the Public Offering Prospectus Directive
(“POP”) applies.31  The European Union does not proscribe standard distribu-
tion rules or liability rules; these matters are left to host states.
Forum shopping for disclosure rules within the European Union is limited
by the Listings Directive requirement that a company must list first in the coun-
try of its registered office, if it is listing there at all.  Thus, a French company
seeking to list its securities on the Paris Bourse and other exchanges would have
to do so in Paris first, with the result that its securities would be subject to
French disclosure rules throughout the European Union.  If the French com-
pany were not listing in France, however, it could list in any other country first
and be subject to that country’s rules.  No forum shopping constraint applies to
the distribution of entirely unlisted securities.32
A 1998 report of the U.K. Treasury, Public Offers of Securities, finds that
there have been very few cross-border public offerings in the European Union
despite the promise of the Directives.33  Indeed, it appears that the 1999 and
28. See MJDS, supra note 24, at 30,049.
29. See Edward Alden, Canadians Mobilise Over Loss of MJDS, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at 34.
30. See id.
31. See generally Manning Warren, Regulatory Harmony in the European Communities: The
Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 19 (1990).
32. See Brian J. Fahrney, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-Emption Due to
Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 772 n.155 (1992).
33. HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, PUBLIC OFFERS OF SECURITIES (1998) (visited Oct. 25, 2000)
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/reg/posec.html> [hereinafter PUBLIC  OFFERS
OF SECURITIES].
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2000 Deutsche Telekom distributions are the only instances of a European-wide
public offering.34  Obstacles to such offers include the need to make translations
and the need to include information specific to a country, such as paying agents,
the income tax system, and the method of notification of investors (together
with the cost of the legal advice required to make this determination).  With
listed securities, host states impose additional requirements despite the provi-
sions of the Listing Directive.  While the European Union has undertaken to
perfect its system,35 concrete corrective measures have yet to be advanced by the
European Commission.36
The U.K. Treasury also alludes to another possible cause of the low usage of
the Directives, even in connection with IPOs: Large companies distribute and
list their securities in one member state and allow investors to come to that state
to buy and trade the securities.  The very premise of the mutual recognition re-
gime—that public offerings need to be distributed in several territories—may
be wrong.  As long as investors (or their representatives) can buy the issue
somewhere within the European Union, there may be no need to offer the se-
curity in multiple territories.  A single market could be achieved simply by en-
suring that member states not apply their rules to their own investors extra-
territorially (as does the United States).  In the European Union, member
states do not apply securities laws extra-territorially, so this is not a problem.  I
develop this possibility at more length as part of the off-shore free-zone option
in Part VI.
One additional reason for the low usage of the cross-border Directives may
be the wide scope for private placements within the European Union and the
relative ease of the resale of privately distributed securities to public investors.
Many countries have broad exemptions from disclosure requirements for sales
to sophisticated investors or to market professionals.  In addition, the Directives
grant a general exemption to “eurosecurities” that are: (1) underwritten and
distributed by a syndicate at least two of the members of which have their regis-
tered offices in different states (multiple state underwriters); (2) offered on a
significant scale in one or more states other than that of the issuer’s registered
office (distribution in state other than issuer’s); and (3) subscribed for or initially
acquired only through a credit institution or other financial institution (sold to
banks).37  Eurosecurities are exempted from the E.U. disclosure requirements if
34. Often, however, there are European-wide private placements combined with retail distribu-
tions in the issuer’s home market, so-called “international style” offerings.  Many of these offerings use
U.S.-type public documentation, due to the demands of the investors, even though such documentation
is not required.  See Jackson & Pan, supra note 21. Deutsche Telekom made another European-wide
retail distribution, as part of a worldwide retail distribution, in June 2000.  See A. Ostrovsky & U. Har-
nischfeger, Deutsche Telekom in Global Balancing Act, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 2000, at 33.
35. See FINANCIAL SERVICES: IMPLEMENTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS:
ACTION PLAN (1999).
36. However, THE FORUM OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, A “EUROPEAN PASSPORT”
FOR ISSUERS (May 10, 2000), has formulated proposals to deal with some of these issues.
37. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 312 (7th ed. 2000).
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they are not subject to “a generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing.”
Thus, a German company could issue securities underwritten by a bank syndi-
cate, including Deutsche Bank and Barclays, and sell the securities to various
banks in London, who might then resell them to individual investors (the pro-
verbial Belgian dentists).
The “eurosecurities” exemption has been implemented in different forms in
different member states.  For example, Germany has said that the “canvassing”
prohibition only applies to door-to-door sales, and not apparently to calls to cli-
ents.  The Netherlands has said that a retail investor may be approached by a
financial institution as long as this is not done systematically by way of a general
campaign.  Neither Germany nor the Netherlands has limited the “eurosecuri-
ties” exemption to particular types of securities, whereas Belgium has limited it
to Eurobonds.38  The U.K. Treasury Report concludes that the “eurosecurities”
exemption has not been relied upon much in practice because of the broad
definition in some states of a generalized campaign of advertising, or because of
restrictive definitions of “eurosecurities.”  In the United Kingdom, issues rely
on private placement exemptions (offers to market professionals) rather than
on the “eurosecurities exemption.”39
C. Extending  Mutual Recognition
This Section considers three approaches to extending mutual recognition:
(1) extending the MJDS to additional countries, specifically the United King-
dom; (2) recognizing home country rules of “efficient” markets; and (3) adopt-
ing a much broader version of mutual recognition, such as “portable reciproc-
ity.”
1. Extending the MJDS to the United Kingdom.  One alternative for
internationalizing securities markets would be to perfect mutual recognition by
cutting down on its exceptions and extending the rule to other countries.
Indeed, one simple solution might be for the United States to extend the MJDS,
in a more complete form, to the United Kingdom.  Today, the international
importance of U.K. public rules is very small because, as discussed above, there
are almost no pan-European public offerings.  However, if E.U. obstacles to
such offerings were removed, issuers might prefer to use U.K. rules for such
offerings, and recognition of the U.K. rules by the United States would permit
distribution of securities sold publicly in both Europe and the United States,
and perhaps worldwide, under U.K. rules.
The United Kingdom would be a logical candidate for the MJDS extension,
given its shared Anglo-Saxon tradition and English language with the United
States and Canada.  The lack of substantive difference between U.S. and Cana-
dian rules was an important factor in the initial adoption of the MJDS; one
study has shown that there is little difference between the substance of U.K.
38. Id.
39. PUBLIC OFFERS OF SECURITIES, supra note 33, at § 5.23.
SCOTT_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:27 PM
Page 71: Summer 2000] INTERNATIONALIZING MARKETS 85
and U.S. disclosure rules.40  Indeed, it appears that the SEC considered the ex-
tension of the MJDS to the United Kingdom over a decade ago, only to reject it
due to the SEC’s concern with lax enforcement standards.  With the advent of
new, tougher securities law enforcement in the United Kingdom, under the Fi-
nancial Supervisory Authority (“FSA”), this would be much less of a problem
today.
However, this solution will probably not work for the following reasons.
First, the MJDS system creates a basic inequity for domestic issuers.  Under the
MJDS, foreign issuers can use either their home country or U.S. rules, but U.S.
issuers must use U.S. rules.  Such inequities could create pressure to change
U.S. domestic rules.41  Indeed, in the European Union, it was widely believed
and accepted that the home-country approach would shortly lead to conver-
gence of disclosure standards (to some optimal level) as domestic issuers pres-
sured governments to change local rules.  In the international context, such
convergence is likely to be less acceptable, particularly to the United States.
Thus, use of the MJDS is likely to result in long-term inequities for U.S. domes-
tic issuers, who will be forced to compete for capital with foreign firms using
more efficient disclosure rules.
Second, the MJDS as extended to the United Kingdom, would only permit
“real” U.K. companies to issue securities under U.K. rules.  As we have seen,
only “real” Canadian companies can currently make use of the MJDS.  The ra-
tionale for this limitation is probably one of enforcement.  While it is true that
the MJDS contemplates some enforcement by the United States, as by the ap-
plication of Rule 10b-5, this is ex post rather than ex ante.  The MJDS basically
relies on Canada to monitor and enforce compliance with initial and ongoing
disclosure requirements.  If Nigerian companies, for example, were permitted to
use Canadian rules to issue securities in the United States, how would Canadian
authorities be able to enforce Canadian rules against Nigerian violators?  One
could imagine that submission to Canadian jurisdiction might be a condition for
use of Canadian rules.  But what would this mean in practice if the assets, man-
agement, and directors of the Nigerian issuers were outside Canada?42  More
fundamentally, the United States would be concerned with whether Canada
would have any substantial interest in enforcing its rules when the issuers were
non-Canadian firms outside Canadian jurisdiction.  Absent confidence in Cana-
dian enforcement, the United States would not want to permit non-Canadian
firms to issue securities in the United States under Canadian rules.  As dis-
40. See Mario Fallone, Comparing Disclosure Requirements in the United States with those found
in the United Kingdom (1999) (unpublished third year paper, Harvard Law School) (on file with the
author).
41. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corpo-
rate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 672-73 (1999) (questioning whether the
SEC can allow foreign issuers access to U.S. markets based on “even marginally relaxed financial stan-
dards,” if it denies U.S. issuers the same ability).
42. Concerns about such jurisdictional issues are reflected in the current U.S. approach to the
regulation of foreign mutual funds, for example requiring them to be offered through a U.S. vehicle.
See 15 U.S.C. §80a-7(d) (1994).
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cussed below, such enforcement problems are even more serious when consid-
ering broader choice in the use of disclosure rules.
If the MJDS were only applicable to “real” U.K. companies, its extension
would not do much to achieve OSI.  The potential attractiveness of the U.K. ex-
tension is not merely to allow U.K. companies to access U.S. markets, but to
allow all issuers to access U.S. markets under U.K. disclosure rules.  Given en-
forcement concerns, and given the limited ability of the United Kingdom to en-
force its rules against non-U.K. firms, the U.K. extension has limited utility.
Third, the MJDS extension to the United Kingdom would do little to solve
the problem of non-standardized distribution and enforcement rules.  The
MJDS, for example, provides that sales in the United States may not be made
until registration forms are declared effective.  The MJDS specifically rejected
the rule that would have imported the Canadian practice of allowing underwrit-
ers to solicit expressions of interest from potential investors within two business
days prior to filing a preliminary prospectus with Canadian securities regula-
tors.43  In addition, an MJDS extension would not result in standardized en-
forcement rules.  Whereas primary responsibility for administrative enforce-
ment is left with the home country (allowing the SEC to step in if necessary),
liability standards (as they apply to compliance with the disclosure standards of
the MJDS) and private enforcement remedies are governed by United States
law.44
2. Extending Mutual Recognition to Efficient Markets.  In 1995, Ed Greene,
Daniel Braverman, and Sebastian Sperber proposed a somewhat more
ambitious and quite sensible extension of the mutual recognition principle.45
Under their approach, the United States would allow securities of foreign
companies to be purchased in the United States under their home country
disclosure rules if the home market for the securities in question were
considered to be efficient, assuming that the home country gave reciprocal
privileges to U.S. companies. The main criteria for making such a judgment
would be whether the home market met: (1) minimum disclosure standards; (2)
minimum periodic reporting requirements; (3) satisfactory rules preventing
market manipulation and ensuring market transparency; and (4) minimum
market capitalization and trading volume requirements.46  The premise of this
approach is that “in certain markets outside the United States all material
developments about a company could reasonably be expected to be made
publicly available, and all publicly available information about the company
could reasonably be expected to be reflected in the price at which its shares
trade in the home market.”47
43. See MJDS, supra note 24, at 30,047.
44. See id. at 30,049.
45. See Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the In-
ternational Capital Markets, 50 BUS. LAW. 413 (1995) [hereinafter Greene et al., Hegemony].
46. See id. at 438-39.
47. Id. at 436.
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This proposal was basically aimed at secondary market trading, rather than
primary public distributions.48  It is unlikely that the efficiency approach would
work nearly as well in the primary public markets, which have no real “market”
price.  In the case of IPOs, by definition, no public market incorporating price
information is available at the time of the distribution.
Even in the case of secondary distributions, the price of the issued stock will
often be fixed, and therefore will not be purchased at a “market” price.  Even if
the price of a secondary issue is priced with reference to the market price, the
price will not actually be the market price.  At the time the stock is purchased,
the purchaser will pay the fixed price rather than the market price.
This proposal also can be criticized because it creates inequities for U.S. is-
suers who continue to face the more onerous SEC requirements.  The authors
have several responses to this criticism, but none that are altogether convinc-
ing.49  First, they argue that U.S. companies would not be subject to any new re-
quirements.  This is true but does not squarely address the dual standard prob-
lem.  Second, they argue that U.S. issuers would be at no greater disadvantage
given the existing ability of U.S. investors to participate in primary offerings by
non-U.S. issuers under Regulation S, Regulation D, and Rule 144A.  Regula-
tion D and Rule 144A offerings are private rather than public, and U.S. inves-
tors currently have a limited ability to participate in public primary distribution
markets outside the United States.50  Third, they argue that deference to home
country rules would only be permitted on a reciprocal basis, so U.S. companies
would get some offsetting advantage when making distributions abroad.  Reci-
procity mitigates the problem of the dual standard in the U.S. market, particu-
larly given that the U.S. markets would presumably always be regarded as effi-
cient, but the problem remains.  The question is whether it is really a fair trade
for U.S. issuers to get access to smaller foreign markets in exchange for foreign
issuers having improved access to the U.S. market.
Finally, the Greene proposal would do little to solve the problem of non-
standardized distribution and enforcement rules.  Indeed, the objective of the
proposal is somewhat different from the objective for reform considered in this
article.  It would like to relax the requirements for foreign issuers selling stock
in the U.S. marketplace, whereas my objective is to achieve OSI.
3. Broader Extensions of Mutual Recognition.  Three broader versions of
mutual recognition have been advanced that would permit a firm to issue
securities in any market under: (1) whatever country’s rules the issuer chooses,
the so-called “portable reciprocity” rule advanced by Stephen Choi and
Andrew Guzman;51 (2) the rules of the issuer’s place of incorporation,
48. The proposal sought to cut back the Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption from ‘34 Act registration re-
quirements for companies not meeting the efficiency criteria.
49. See Greene et al., Hegemony, supra note 45, at 433-34.
50. See discussion infra Part V.
51. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 10, at 907.
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advocated by Roberta Romano;52 or (3) the rules of the issuer’s home country as
determined by the corporation’s nationality, proposed by Merritt Fox.53  The
only real difference between the three proposals is the degree of choice.
Absent consideration of which countries will choose to participate in these
regimes, choice is totally unconstrained under the Choi and Guzman “portable
reciprocity” proposal because an issuer can choose the rules of any country.
Thus, a U.S. issuer could issue securities in France under Antiguan rules.  The
Romano proposal does have an important constraint: The issuer can use only
the rules of its place of incorporation.  While Romano envisions that issuers
would be free to choose any place to incorporate regardless of the location of
their “seat”—as in the United States but not in Europe—once the incorporation
decision has been made, further choice of rules would be constrained.
Fox’s approach provides for the least choice, because “nationality” would be
determined by basic business facts, such as where the entrepreneurs who
formed the business reside, where the current headquarters are located, and
where the bulk of the firm’s operations are conducted.
Insofar as these proposals would result in a wide range of actual usage of
different countries’ rules, investors would face additional search costs, and risk
having a lack of information.  We have already discussed the problems of deal-
ing with this situation by positing discounting and diversified portfolios.  Even if
the discounting mechanism worked, so that issuers would have to pay more for
their capital if they chose unclear or obscure rules, issuers bent on fraud would
not care; they would take their expensive money and run.  It would be politi-
cally impossible for a host country to allow such a result.
In reality, investor choice will be fundamentally constrained.  Investors will
be able to use only the rules of home countries where both host and home coun-
tries have agreed to accept such arrangements.  At the very least, host countries
like the United States would have to agree to allow sale of securities in their
territories under a broad range of foreign rules.  This proposal is exceedingly
unlikely to be adopted by the United States given the fact that the current
MJDS arrangement for Canada does not fully accept Canadian disclosure rules,
that the SEC has refused to extend its partial acceptance of Canadian rules to
other countries, and that the SEC is even questioning whether to keep the
MJDS for Canada.54  Guzman and Choi recognize this reality by holding out the
prospect that their system need not apply to purchases by individual investors—
that is, public primary markets.55  This concession, however, makes their pro-
posal unnecessary because issuers in private markets choose their own level of
disclosure, free from any country’s rules.  Countries generally permit this choice
because they see no need to protect institutional investors.
52. See Romano, supra note 2, at 2419.
53. See Fox, supra note 3, at 702.
54. See Alden, supra note 29.
55. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 10, at 943.
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If these proposals were to work in any sensible way, countries would also
have to agree to enforce the rules that issuers choose and to decide which par-
ticular country or countries will enforce them.  Let us focus on administrative
enforcement, a key element of securities regulation.  The assurance of adequate
administrative enforcement is close to impossible under the Choi and Guzman
proposal.  Assume that we had a French company issuing securities in the
United States under Antiguan rules.  Suspending disbelief about whether the
United States would accept the adequacy of Antiguan disclosure rules, which
country would enforce the Antiguan rules?  If enforcement responsibility were
left with Antigua, there would almost certainly be no enforcement due to the
lack of resources and interest of Antigua.56  This problem cannot be solved by
requiring issuers to pay fees to Antigua to enforce the rules.57  Even if Antigua
received a fee, it would offer little assurance that Antigua would actually en-
force its rules.  In principle, the U.S. or French authorities could enforce the
Antiguan rules, but it is hard to see how this would work in practice.  Suppose
that under Antiguan rules, prospectuses are filed and reviewed by Antiguan
authorities.  How does the SEC or the Commission des Opérations de Bourse
(“COB”) make sure that Antiguan authorities have reviewed the prospectuses?
In theory, the SEC or COB could review the prospectuses under Antiguan
rules, but this would be extremely burdensome because one could not expect
either agency to have the necessary detailed knowledge and understanding of
those rules, particularly as those rules may have evolved under Antiguan prac-
tice.
One possible, but inadequate, response to this problem might be just to
leave to Antigua how and to what extent to enforce its rules.  Because the
United States must, under this proposal, accept the rules of any jurisdiction,
those rules in practice (as enforced) could amount to no rules at all.  In short,
the authors would argue that Antiguan rules, as enforced by Antigua, must be
accepted by the United States.  But this argument only pushes us back to the
fundamental problem that neither the United States, nor probably any other
country with a significant investor base, will allow public distribution of securi-
ties in its markets under virtually no rules at all.  The enforcement problems are
almost as severe under the Romano proposal—all one eliminates is the possi-
bility of French involvement—because only an issuer incorporated in Antigua
(but not necessarily doing any business there) would be permitted to issue secu-
rities in the United States under Antiguan rules.
One should insist that no country’s rules may be used unless that country as-
sures other countries that the rules will be enforced.  It is unlikely, however,
that credible assurances could be given in practice.  It might be easy to elimi-
56. See SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 20, at 1240-44; see also, Cox Regulatory Duopoly,
supra note 14, at 1239-44.
57. But see Choi & Guzman, supra note 10, at 933 (arguing that “enforcement officials in a regime
jurisdiction can charge a fee to issuers seeking to avail themselves of the regime’s securities apparatus
and enforcement resources”).
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nate the use of rules of “offshore centers” such as Antigua58 but what about such
“onshore centers” such as Luxembourg or Hong Kong?
Of the three proposals, the Fox “nationality” proposal seems to be the least
objectionable on enforcement grounds.  All issuers would at least come from
countries where they did most of their business or had established their head-
quarters, thus eliminating smaller “haven” countries with less enforcement ca-
pability.  Yet the same basic problem remains: How can the host country (the
place where the securities are offered) be assured of enforcement by the home
country (the issuer’s home country)?  A similar issue has plagued banking
regulation when banks operate abroad through branches.59  In the banking con-
text it is accepted that the major regulatory responsibility for assuring solvency
falls on the home country,60 because this is where the bank’s major operations
are located.  The host country, however, is concerned with the safety of its con-
sumers (depositors in the branches of the foreign banks), which in turn depends
on the adequacy of regulation by the home country.  This problem has been ad-
dressed by host countries such as the United States by unilaterally conditioning
foreign branch entry and continued operation on a determination of the ade-
quacy of foreign regulation.  And countries such as the United States have es-
tablished cooperative relationships with—and insisted on information flow
from—foreign regulators to aid in such determination.  As a complement to
such unilateral action, international agreements among regulators have been
reached to facilitate their need for information exchanges.61
One should not, however, conclude that this home country control approach
to international banking regulation is directly transferable to international secu-
rities regulation.  The host country’s interest in depositor safety is quite limited
if deposits in branches of foreign banks are uninsured, as is the case in the
United States.  Indeed, in 1991, largely as a result of the BCCI affair, the United
States shifted from a system in which deposits could be insured by branches of
foreign banks to one in which they could not.62  The United States forced for-
eign banks to offer insured deposits through U.S. bank subsidiaries, which are
58. Offshore, in this context, means small islands with little domestic economic activity.
59. See Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 487,
491 (1992) (noting that in the case of branches, the host country is largely at the mercy of the home
country).
60. See BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF
BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS (THE CONCORDAT) IV 1 (1983); see also Sydney J. Key & Hal S.
Scott, International Trade in Banking Services: A Conceptual Framework 23, (Group of Thirty, Occa-
sional Paper 35, 1991).
61. Examples of such international agreements among regulators include a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between the United States and Canada dated April 30, 1998, a Statement of Cooperation
between the United States and Argentina dated September 3, 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding
between the United States and Germany dated August 7, 2000, two Statements of Cooperation be-
tween the United States and Chile dated March 10, 1997 and April 16, 1998, and a Memorandum of
Understanding between the United States and the United Kingdom dated November 19, 1996 (on file
with author).
62. See Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2286
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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regulated by the United States.  Thus, today, the United States only accepts
home country control for international banking where no retail depositors can
be injured due to the inadequacy of foreign regulation.  It is therefore highly
unlikely that home country enforcement will be accepted where U.S. public in-
vestors could be at risk for poor foreign enforcement of rules.63
In principle, the European Union does accept home country rules and en-
forcement for cross-border securities issues.  However, as previously discussed,
there have been very few cross-border public issues under that regime, due to
the cost of translation and the persistence of local requirements.  Further, the
European Union has a political and economic infrastructure with supranational
institutions such as  the Commission and the Court of Justice, and close ties
among regulators, that make the home-country approach more feasible than it
would be on an international scale, where such arrangements are lacking.
Another enforcement problem is how private claims against issuers get re-
solved.  Choi and Guzman consider a number of different alternatives, but sug-
gest that the “regime jurisdiction,” or the place where the securities regulations
governing the issue are located, would be the appropriate place to litigate such
an action.64  The authors contend that this rule should be a default rule only, and
that issuers who wish to contract around such a rule can do so if they desire.
They argue that this is the most acceptable alternative because the regime juris-
diction officials have the best understanding of the regime’s rules and regula-
tions.  Further, they contend that enforcement will occur with more zeal, owing
to the fact that the courts will be “upholding [the regime’s] own laws, which has
a positive effect on the country’s legal system generally.”65  Can one really
imagine an effective private enforcement regime that relies on litigation in An-
tiguan courts?
Romano recognizes that under her approach, the choice of fora basically
would be limited to the issuer’s place of incorporation.66  She feels, however,
that the burden this would place on the ability of an investor to litigate a claim
would simply be built into the issuer’s cost of capital.  Consequently, she notes
that foreign companies seeking, for example, U.S. capital, “might therefore find
it in their self-interest to ensure that U.S. investors could prosecute securities
claims in U.S. courts.”67  Romano recognizes problems with this approach, par-
ticularly whether U.S. courts would accept jurisdiction of these claims.
63. Any home-country regime must, of course, determine what is the home country.  In the bank-
ing context this is relatively clear because every bank seeking to do business abroad will be able to
specify its home country regulator; for example, the regulator to which it reports and by which it is ex-
amined and regulated on a continual basis.  This issue would be trickier in the securities regulation con-
text, where the question of who is the issuer’s home country for the purpose of securities regulation—
which is determined by somewhat unclear criteria—would only come up at the time of an international
issue.  One virtue of the Romano place-of-incorporation approach is that it would eliminate this prob-
lem.
64. Choi & Guzman, supra note 10, at 930.
65. Id.
66. See Romano, supra note 2, at 2422.
67. Id.
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To a significant extent, the issue of acceptability of foreign rules depends on
the capability of foreign enforcement.  Even if the substance of foreign rules is
acceptable, host countries need to be assured that those rules will be enforced.
One way to understand our present international system of host country rules
and host country enforcement is through the reluctance of host countries to de-
pend on enforcement of rules by other countries.
One final point about these proposals: Like the MJDS, none of them ad-
dresses the problem of non-standardized distribution rules.
V
OFFSHORE FREE-ZONE
The third alternative for achieving OSI is an offshore free-zone.  Under this
approach, countries would permit issuers to offer securities to the public—in-
cluding residents of their own countries—offshore, subject only to minimum
disclosure requirements.  This proposal would require substantial change in
U.S. regulation because, under Regulation S, the United States currently im-
poses significant restrictions on offshore primary distributions to U.S. residents.
A. Regulation S
Under Regulation S, which exempts certain offerings of securities from reg-
istration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 (“33 Act”),68 domestic
and foreign issuers face substantial restrictions when making offshore public
primary distributions to U.S. residents.  Regulation S imposes general and spe-
cific conditions on such offerings.  The specific conditions depend on the type of
issuer and securities.
1. General Conditions.  The general conditions of Regulation S, Rule 903,
require that any offer or sale by the issuer, a distributor, any of their affiliates,
or any person acting on behalf of any of the foregoing, be made in an “offshore
transaction” without “directed selling” efforts in the United States.69  To satisfy
the requirement of “offshore transaction,” the offer must not be made to a
person in the United States, and: (1) either the buyer must be outside the
United States (or the seller must reasonably believe this is the case); or (2) the
transaction must be “executed in, on or through a physical trading floor of an
established foreign securities exchange that is located outside the United
States.”70  “Directed selling” efforts means activities to condition the U.S.
market, such as placing an advertisement in a publication with a general
circulation in the United States or conducting a roadshow in the United States.
The general conditions do not permit making a primary distribution to U.S.
residents who are in the United States—all but a small percentage of U.S. resi-
68. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-905 (2000).
69. Id.
70. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h) (2000).
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dents—unless the transaction is executed on the physical trading floor of an es-
tablished foreign securities exchange.  In adopting Regulation S, the Commis-
sion believed that primary offerings abroad were infrequently executed through
such exchanges.71  Primary market transactions almost never take place on an
exchange because securities are sold at a fixed price through the underwriting
process.  Only if there were unsold allotments might the underwriter seek to sell
the securities at a “market” price on an exchange.  Thus, in reality, the general
condition can only be satisfied if the buyer is outside the United States (or the
seller reasonably believes that this is the case).
2. Specific Conditions.  If the distribution is truly international (not
targeted at just one country), or involves “substantial U.S. market interest”
(“SUSMI”), it will be subject to offering restrictions72 and may be subject to
transfer restrictions that apply during a “distribution compliance period.”
There is no SUSMI in a foreign company’s equity securities if the issuer
reasonably believes that in its most recent fiscal year, the United States did not
constitute the single largest market for the class of equities, and that either less
than 20% of the trading in the class took place in the United States or more
than 55% of the trading took place in a single foreign country.73  This test means
that IPOs of foreign issuers will never have SUSMI.  It also means that even
foreign companies making secondary offerings, other than those from emerging
markets, will rarely have SUSMI, since most of the trading in their shares will
not be in the United States.74
So-called Category I securities (those that are distributed in only one for-
eign country or have no SUSMI) have no distribution compliance period, and
therefore no offering conditions or transfer restrictions.  Again, this includes
most foreign securities.  The distribution compliance period for other equities is
forty days for so-called “Category II” securities, those issued by a reporting for-
eign issuer—a foreign issuer subject to the broad disclosure requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”)75 —and one year for all other issu-
ers, so-called “Category III” securities.  In addition, it should be understood
that Section 4(3) of the ‘33 Act prohibits any U.S. dealer from selling unregis-
tered securities to investors for forty days.  This prohibition applies even to
Category I securities, for example, IPOs of foreign issuers.76
71. See supra text accompanying note 59; Exchange Act Release No. 37,942, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306
(May 2, 1990).
72. The offering restrictions, Rule 902(g), 17 C.F.R. §230.902(g) (2000), require, with respect to all
unregistered publicly distributed securities, that (a) each distributor agree in writing that it will comply
with Regulation S and (b) offering materials include statements that the securities are unregistered and
may not be offered or sold in the United States or to U.S. persons during the distribution compliance
period.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(j)(i)-(ii)(2000).
74. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 5-14.
75. A foreign issuer means a foreign government or foreign private issuer.  For the definition of a
foreign private issuer, see supra text accompanying note 26.
76. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 1, at 5-27.
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The rationale for these distribution compliance periods for U.S. investors is
not altogether clear.  The distribution compliance periods could be based on a
consideration of when the securities have “come to rest,” a concept rooted in
the law for public distributions within the United States.  Generally speaking,
one cannot have public sales of unregistered securities until the initial distribu-
tion of those securities has been completed, i.e., until the securities have come
to rest.77  This idea is based on the notion that public sales of unregistered secu-
rities is only permissible after the initial distribution of the securities is com-
plete.  It is therefore necessary to determine when that is.  Obviously, if the ini-
tial distribution were considered to be complete in a very short period, say one
day, the registration requirement for the initial public distributions would be
largely irrelevant.  Under the Rule 144 safe harbor, the minimum holding pe-
riod before public resales are permitted, subject to certain amount restrictions
and information requirements, is one year.  After two years, these restrictions
and requirements are removed for all sales other than those by affiliates of the
issuer.78
The Regulation S distribution compliance periods, however, are shorter
than one year in many cases, for example, forty days for securities of a reporting
foreign issuer.  After forty days, these securities can be resold abroad to U.S.
purchasers, as long as the sale is made on a designated offshore securities mar-
ket.79  The ability to resell to U.S. purchasers outside the United States after
forty days suggests that the distribution compliance periods are not really moti-
vated by coming to rest concerns.  If so, the distribution compliance period for
all securities (not just those in Category II) would be much longer, probably at
least one year, to be consistent with Rule 144.
In fact, it seems that the Regulation S compliance periods are designed to
protect against flowback of securities into the U.S. market.  The SEC has stated
that “[t]he purpose of the distribution compliance period is to ensure that dur-
ing the offering period and the subsequent aftermarket trading that takes place
offshore, the persons relying on the safe harbor—issuers, distributors and their
affiliates—are not engaged in an unregistered, non-exempt distribution into the
United States capital markets.”80  The SEC has adopted these restrictions in or-
der to prevent flowback of the securities into the United States.81  Flowback is
minimized, according to the SEC, by the imposition of offering conditions and
transfer restrictions during the distribution compliance period.  The more con-
cern there is over flowback, the longer the distribution compliance period and
the more rigorous the restrictions.
77. See SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 20, at 443.
78. 17 C.F.R. 230.144(c),(d),(e) (2000).
79. See infra text accompanying note 92.
80. Securities Act Release No. 7705, Exchange Act Release No. 39,668, 63 Fed. Reg. 9632, 9635
(Feb. 25, 1998).
81. See Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Act Release No. 37,942, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306
(May 2, 1990).
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No transfer restrictions are imposed on Category II securities, but they are
imposed on Category III securities.  For equity securities,82 these restrictions
generally require that: (1) no offer or sale be made to a U.S. person (domestic
resident) or for the account of a U.S. person; (2) the purchaser certifies that he
is not a U.S. person or acquiring for a U.S. person; (3) the purchaser agrees to
abide by Regulation S (which prevents reselling to a U.S. person during the dis-
tribution compliance period); (4) for domestic issuers, the certificates contain a
legend to the effect that transactions are prohibited except in accordance with
Regulation S (seemingly prohibiting certificateless distributions)83; and (5) the
issuer refuses to register transfers of securities not made in accordance with the
provisions of Regulation S or, if the securities are in bearer form or if foreign
law prevents the issuer from refusing registration, other reasonable transfer re-
strictions are adopted, such as legends.
The net result of these provisions is that unregistered securities offered in-
ternationally (in more than a single market), where there is substantial U.S.
market interest, cannot be resold (for up to one year in the case of certain equi-
ties and forty days for most debt) in public primary markets to U.S. residents,
whether the offers or sales occur inside the United States or outside the United
States.  This prohibition may be implemented through both offering and trans-
fer restrictions for certain issuers, but the same basic prohibition applies to sales
to U.S. investors inside or outside the United States.  This is true despite claims
by the SEC that Regulation S represents a territorial approach to securities
regulation.
3. Resales After the End of the Distribution Compliance Period.  After the
distribution compliance period is over, Regulation S continues to apply to
resales, but its restrictions on resales to U.S. persons are considerably relaxed.
Offering and transaction restrictions are removed.  While no offer can be made
to a person in the United States and no directed selling efforts may be made by
the seller in the United States, the seller can sell the shares on a “designated
offshore securities market” to anyone, including a U.S. person, as long as the
82. For debt securities, no offer or sale must be made to a U.S. person or for the account or benefit
of a U.S. person and the securities must be represented by a temporary global security, which is not ex-
changeable for definitive securities until the end of the distribution compliance period, and, for persons
other than distributors, until certification of beneficial ownership of the securities by a non-U.S. person.
The use of the temporary global security, under which transfers of securities are registered, allows more
effective control of the Regulation S restrictions on sales to U.S. persons.
83. The SEC has granted an exemption from the legend requirement to the European Association
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (“EASDAQ”) in connection with its listing of
IPOs of U.S. issuers.  EASDAQ could not comply with the requirement because it is a screen-based
market trading system in certificateless shares.  EASDAQ proposed, and the SEC accepted, alternative
restrictions to ensure that U.S. investors did not participate.  The SEC also noted that U.S. firms were
not permitted to participate in the EASDAQ market and there were no EASDAQ screens in the
United States.  Presumably, this was important to the SEC insofar as it made it less likely for U.S. per-
sons to participate in EASDAQ.  Of course, all major U.S. broker/dealers have European affiliates that
do participate in EASDAQ and those affiliates have screens.  It would not be difficult for the U.S. firm
to hand off a trade to its affiliate.  See EASD Automated Quotation, SEC No-Action Letter, [1999
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,586 (July 27, 1999).
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sale has not been prearranged to such buyer.84  A “designated offshore securities
market” must be organized under foreign law, be associated with a generally
recognized community of securities professionals, for example, brokers, dealers,
and banks; be subject to regulatory oversight and legal standards; require
reporting of transactions on a regular basis to regulators; and have a price
quotation and organized clearance and settlement system.  Regulation S itself
states that certain markets qualify, including stock exchanges in all major
markets, such as the London Stock Exchange, Paris Bourse, and Tokyo Stock
Exchange.85
Thus, after the expiration of any applicable distribution compliance period,
resales of securities distributed in public primary markets outside the United
States may generally be bought and sold by U.S. residents on foreign exchanges,
without violation of the ‘33 Act, as long as no efforts are made to sell the securi-
ties in the United States to U.S. residents.
Indeed, once the Regulation S distribution compliance period ends, persons
who have purchased Regulation S securities of foreign issuers in the secondary
market offshore may immediately make public resales of those securities in the
United States itself.  Such securities are not “restricted securities” within the
meaning of Rule 905—that Rule only applies to domestic issuers86—and are thus
not subject to the one-year minimum holding period for “restricted securities”
under Rule 144.87
Such securities may, however, become subject to the ‘34 Act if they are
owned by more than 300 U.S. shareholders,88 which will require the issuer to
comply with U.S. disclosure requirements, including U.S. GAAP reconciliation
requirements.  Under Rule 12g3-2(b), however, such securities are exempt from
such U.S. disclosure requirements as long as the issuers file with the SEC what-
ever reports they file in their home countries and the securities are not listed on
a U.S. exchange, or traded on the OTCBB.89  Such securities can generally only
be traded in the illiquid pink sheets market, where there are no continuous
price quotations.
Domestic issuers, whose Regulation S offerings are Category III securities,
and thus subject to a one-year distribution compliance period, are subject to
Rule 144.  At the end of one year, domestic issuers could make public resales in
the United States subject to Rule 144 requirements, because the Rule 144
minimum holding period is also one year.
84. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.902(h), 230.904 (2000).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b) (2000).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 230.905 (2000).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (2000).
88. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (1994).
89. The Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption from ‘34 Act registration does not apply to listed securities, and
since 1998, it has not applied to OTCBB.  See Exchange Act Release No. 38,456, 64 S.E.C. Docket 490
(Mar. 31, 1997).
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B. Use of the Internet
The Regulation S exemption from ‘33 Act registration requirements only
applies where there are no public sales to persons in the United States.  The
SEC has issued an Interpretation to clarify when the posting of offering or so-
licitation material on Internet Web sites would not be considered activity taking
place in the United States.90
The Interpretation first provides that an issuer must employ procedures
“reasonably designed to avoid targeting the United States.”  This requirement
generally will be met if the Web site includes a prominent disclaimer that the
offer is directed only to countries other than the United States and the Web site
offeror implements certain procedures, such as ascertaining the purchaser’s
residence prior to the sale.
Where, however, the securities are unregistered publicly distributed securi-
ties issued by domestic issuers, more restrictive requirements apply.  U.S. issu-
ers are required to implement password-type procedures that are reasonably
designed to ensure that only non-U.S. persons can obtain access to the offer.
Persons seeking access to the Internet offer would have to demonstrate that
they are not U.S. persons before obtaining the password for the site.  The SEC
justified these additional restrictions on three grounds: (1) the substantial con-
tacts a U.S. issuer has with the United States; (2) the strong likelihood that se-
curities of U.S. issuers initially offered and sold offshore will enter U.S. trading
markets (reasoning similar to that underlying the adoption of offering and
transaction restrictions under Regulation S); and (3) U.S. issuers and investors
have a much greater expectation that securities offerings by domestic issuers
will be subject to U.S. securities laws.
VI
A NEW PROPOSAL
I would like to put forward the following proposal, in lieu of pursuing har-
monization or any of the variations of home-country or issuer choice of rules:
U.S. investors would be free to participate fully in the primary offshore markets
for foreign issues—removing the waiting period and all restrictions on offshore
sales to U.S. investors.  Prohibitions on directed selling efforts by foreign issuers
would also be removed.  The objective is to allow the development of a deep
and active primary offshore market that will go a long way toward establishing
OSI for foreign securities.  This proposal would require modifications to Regu-
lation S, Section 4(3) (at least through revision of Rule 174), and the Internet
Release.
90. Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet
Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services On-
shore, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,806 (Mar. 27, 1998).
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A. Minimum Disclosure Requirement
The rationale for restricting U.S. investor access to primary distributions
outside the U.S. is basically rooted in a concern over whether adequate disclo-
sure would be made to such investors absent registration.  This concern could
be addressed by requiring that all foreign primary public distributions in which
U.S. investors were free to participate meet certain minimum disclosure re-
quirements.  Minimum disclosure requirements are already assumed under the
MJDS and were rightly an important feature of the Greene proposal.  As has
been argued earlier in this article, we have a readily available benchmark for
such disclosure in the form of the “international standard” used in the private
primary markets.  Disclosure rules could be reverse engineered from market
practices and would differ depending on the type of issue (IPO versus secon-
dary offering), security, and issuer.
The availability of a market benchmark makes the more radical reforms
based on issuer choice of disclosure rules unnecessary.  Those theories are
predicated on the need for regulatory competition to produce the right level of
disclosure.  One is far better off mimicking actual market-based disclosure lev-
els than relying on regulatory competition to produce this result.  As previously
argued, the regulatory competition model is, in any event, theoretically flawed
and impractical.91  On a more general note, the SEC might well benefit by test-
ing its disclosure rules for the domestic market against the private market dis-
closure rules, but that is a subject beyond the scope of this article.
B. Proposal only Applicable to Foreign Private Issuers
At least initially, I would restrict this exemption from Regulation S to for-
eign private issuers and continue to apply Category II conditions on sales in the
United States to U.S. persons during the “distribution compliance period.”
Thus, during the forty-day Category II distribution compliance period, U.S.
persons, wherever located, could buy and resell foreign securities outside the
United States, but could not resell those securities in the United States.  After
the expiration of the forty-day period, sales could be made back into the United
States as at present.  Thus, U.S. persons would be free, without restriction, to
participate in public primary distributions by foreign issuers abroad.  Also, any
purchasers of securities in the primary market could resell their securities
abroad at any time to anyone, including U.S. persons.  This should create a
public primary distribution market outside the United States in which all inves-
tors can participate.  Since all investors, including U.S. investors, can also im-
mediately participate outside the United States in the secondary market for
such securities, the market should also have the required liquidity.
Domestic issuers would still have to comply fully with Regulation S, which
would preclude making offshore public primary distributions to U.S. investors.
While there would be discrimination against use of U.S. issuers’ access to the
91. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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offshore public primary markets, this discrimination would not have a serious
impact on U.S. issuers.  Domestic issuers already must comply with a principal
feature of the U.S. regulatory regime—the necessity to state accounts under
U.S. GAAP accounting principles.  Large-reporting domestic issuers can mini-
mize primary distribution costs through shelf registration, and thus are unlikely
to see great advantages from issuing abroad.  For IPOs, domestic issuers would
not get weaker disclosure standards (apart from U.S. GAAP reconciliation re-
quirements) from issuing abroad given that the “international standard” for
IPOs—requiring compliance by all issuers—is close to that for U.S. public of-
ferings.  In comparison, the discrimination against U.S. issuers under the home
country proposals—under which foreign issuers would be able to distribute se-
curities within the United States under more relaxed standards than domestic
issuers—would be more of a competitive threat to U.S. issuers who would be
put at a competitive disadvantage in their own markets.
C. Investor Protection Considerations
It will surely be argued that because U.S. investors are free to participate
abroad in primary distributions of foreign issuers, whatever protection they are
assured within the U.S. domestic market will be totally eviscerated.  This argu-
ment should fail because the proposal requires minimum disclosures based on
market standards.
Additionally, the proposed change is rather small; one is merely allowing
U.S. persons to make purchases of foreign securities in offshore markets with-
out waiting, at the most, forty days.  All debt securities, whether of reporting or
non-reporting foreign issuers, are subject only to a forty-day distribution com-
pliance period.  The same forty-day waiting period applies to equities issued by
a reporting foreign issuer.  Equities issued by a foreign issuer in which there is
“no substantial U.S. market interest,” which includes all foreign IPOs, can al-
ready be purchased offshore without a waiting period.92  Furthermore, U.S. in-
vestors today can fully participate in offshore primary distribution markets for
Category II securities if they do so through non-U.S. broker-dealers.93
The investor protection value of a forty-day waiting period is ostensibly that,
after forty days, the price of the securities is more reliable because securities
have already traded for some period in the secondary market.  However, there
is no reason that new issues of securities would be more volatile in the forty-day
period after their issue than they are thereafter, particularly where secondary
offerings are concerned, so that prior issues of the class of securities offered are
92. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(b)(i), 230.902(j)(i) (2000).
93. The general prohibition of Rule 903(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a) (2000), only applies to issuers,
distributors, and their affiliates or agents. So Regulation S would not even reach a U.S. broker-dealer
who was not a participant in the distribution.  However, Section 4(3) of the ‘33 Act, together with Rule
174, provides that during a 40-day period following commencement of the offer, no U.S. dealer can de-
liver a prospectus.  The effect is for Category I and II, if a U.S. dealer is complying with the rules, he
cannot sell or execute an offer to buy during that period.  I thank both Howell Jackson and Ed Greene
for bringing this point to my attention.
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already trading in the market.  And even if this were the case for IPOs, U.S. in-
vestors should not be deprived of investing in volatile stocks; they are, after all,
completely free to buy such stocks in the U.S. new issue market, and are more
generally free to buy volatile stocks in the U.S. secondary market.
Perhaps, the objective is not to protect U.S. investors from volatility per se,
but to ensure that the market has forty days to incorporate material information
into the price of the stock.  To begin with, the minimum disclosure require-
ments would require that all material information about the issue be disclosed
at the time of its distribution.  Further, there is no reason to assume that all ma-
terial information about a stock will be incorporated into its price in forty days.
Certainly new material information can develop after forty days, and there is no
reason to assume that all material information that may exist prior to the expi-
ration of forty days will be fully incorporated in the price of the stock by the
end of forty days.
Even if one were to assume that some loss in investor protection might oc-
cur from removing the forty-day waiting period, the loss would seem less than
what might occur under the various home-country rule approaches (where
there was no minimum disclosure), and the amount of loss would be small com-
pared to the gains in investor overall welfare from achieving OSI.
D. Why Offshore and Not Onshore?
Can one defend a system in which public investors have mandated U.S. dis-
closure rules for onshore primary issues, but only minimum disclosure rules for
offshore issues?  I think so.  The SEC has already acknowledged that there are
jurisdictional concerns in extending U.S. disclosure rules to offshore markets;
this is the reason that Regulation S supposedly follows the territorial principle.
In reality, Regulation S does not follow that principle because it restricts par-
ticipation of U.S. investors in offshore primary markets.  Indeed, one could
view Regulation S restrictions as a type of capital control, restricting the flow of
U.S. investor funds to foreign markets.  This proposal takes territorial consid-
erations more seriously and would remove such capital controls.  No other ma-
jor investor country currently restricts offshore activities of their domestic in-
vestors.  Indeed, as we have seen, the ability of European public investors to
buy securities in offshore markets, for example, German investors buying secu-
rities issued in London, makes it generally unnecessary to have European-wide
retail distributions.
In addition, investors’ expectations are probably different when they buy se-
curities in their own country compared to buying securities abroad.  They ex-
pect to be protected by their own laws when buying securities (or anything else)
in their own countries, but do not have such an expectation when making pur-
chases abroad.  While technological advances have made purchases abroad
more seamless than before—investors can call their brokers who may be di-
rectly able to access foreign markets from their computers in the United States,
or at most, will have to pass the order onto foreign affiliates—the investors
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should understand that they are purchasing securities outside the United States,
which are not fully subject to U.S. rules.  Concern about whether investors
would truly understand this can be met by requiring professional intermediaries
to make this clear to their clients.94  Of course, investors could bypass U.S. in-
termediaries and place orders directly with foreign brokers.  But the fact that
the investor is taking significant steps to seek out the securities abroad and
willing to trade with a foreign broker makes protection of such an investor less
compelling.
E. Directed Selling in the U.S.?
Another important question is whether foreign issuers should be free to en-
gage in directed selling efforts for their securities in the United States, even if
U.S. investors will only be free to buy such securities offshore during the wait-
ing period.  If directed selling efforts are prohibited, one can argue that foreign
issuers will not be able to attract the attention of a sufficient individual investor
community to allow a deep and active primary offshore market to develop.  On
the other hand, the more directed selling, the greater the possibility that U.S.
investors might participate, to their detriment, in such markets.
My view is that investors should not be deprived of information about in-
vestment possibilities and that one does not protect investors by depriving them
of information.  We should be fostering a disclosure regime, not a non-
disclosure regime.  Once the decision has been made to allow U.S. investors to
participate in offshore markets, they should know what opportunities exist in
such markets.  Consistent with this proposal, I would also remove Internet re-
strictions on directed promotion of foreign issues to U.S. investors.  However,
one could retain the prohibition on actual sales to U.S. investors over the Inter-
net during the waiting period.  This would ensure that U.S. investors would par-
ticipate in the market through broker-dealers, who would be more likely to
alert investors to potential fraudulent or highly risky offers.
F. Distribution and Enforcement
One major virtue of this proposal, compared to any reform affecting the dis-
tribution of foreign securities in the United States, is that offshore primary sales
of foreign securities would escape any of the U.S. distribution prohibitions; for
example, research report restrictions or prohibition of sales before receipt of a
prospectus.  This permits a fuller development of OSI than could be achieved
by disclosure reforms within the U.S. market.  Investors from all countries could
buy securities in the offshore market under the same set of distribution proce-
dures.  Generally, uniformity of distribution procedures would otherwise only
be achievable through harmonization, which is highly unlikely to occur.
94. See HOWELL E. JACKSON AND EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 689-95 (1999) for other types of required disclosures by intermediaries.
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What about enforcement?  Who would enforce compliance with the “inter-
national” minimum disclosure standards required under the proposal?  The an-
swer should be all jurisdictions whose investors buy the securities.  Thus, the
SEC could take action to prevent or stop distributions that do not comply with
these rules, or seek redress for the failure to comply after the fact.  The difficul-
ties encountered when issuers are free to choose rules, or to use home country
rules, do not exist.  No jurisdiction can claim special expertise in “international”
disclosure rules, which are based on market practice.  This rule would avoid re-
liance on weak enforcement jurisdictions, such as Antigua, to enforce their rules
or on strong enforcement jurisdictions, such as the United States, to enforce
some other country’s rules.
It is true that there may be uneven and different enforcement by several ju-
risdictions of the same international rules.  But this should not deter any issues,
given the fact that the rules themselves are based on market practice.  In any
event, such inconsistencies are preferable by far to proposals, like those of Choi
& Guzman, Romano, and Fox, where no meaningful enforcement can be as-
sured.  If disclosure is good, enforcement of disclosure is also good.
As for general liability standards,  U.S. 10b-5 rules would continue to apply
to the extent that there were sales to U.S. investors resident in the United
States, particularly if the foreign issuer used directed selling efforts in the
United States to reach such investors.95  Section 11, however, would not apply
because under the modified Regulation S proposed here, registration of foreign
issues distributed offshore would not be required.  Either private litigants or the
SEC could enforce 10b-5.
G. Big Whoop?
One criticism of the proposal could be that it does not change things very
much and, therefore, might have very little impact.  To recount, IPOs of foreign
issuers are Category I securities (because there is no substantial U.S. market in-
terest due to the lack of any trading in the past) and can currently be bought
offshore without any waiting period.  Further, any U.S. investor can freely par-
ticipate in all primary foreign distributions through non-U.S. broker-dealers.
This criticism does not withstand scrutiny.
First, my proposal would completely exempt from registration for the first
time all foreign issues, not just Category I securities.  Second, the ability of U.S.
investors to purchase securities in the forty-day period from U.S. broker-
dealers, the usual firms with whom they do business, should greatly increase
U.S. investor participation.  Indeed, the SEC has been reluctant to allow foreign
markets such as the Deutsche Boerse to establish terminals in the offices of
broker-dealers in the U.S., out of concern that such terminals would be used to
95. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975) (effects test covers sales to Americans resident in the U.S.).  Bersch still seems to be good law.
See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 128 n.12
(2d Cir. 1998).
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access foreign primary market distributions.  Under this proposal, any restric-
tions on U.S. broker-dealers’ access to foreign primary markets would be re-
moved.  Participation of U.S. investors also should be significantly aided by
dropping the prohibition on directed selling efforts for foreign primary issues.
Further, if investors can participate freely in foreign primary distribution
markets through foreign broker-dealers who might not keep them informed, in-
vestor protection would be better served by channeling their orders through
U.S. broker-dealers who were under a legal obligation to disclose to investors
the risks of their investments.  The SEC’s position—allowing participation only
through foreign broker-dealers—can only be justified by the perverse logic that
this makes it harder for investors to buy foreign securities.  The problem is that
the investors who overcome the obstacles will be more poorly informed.96
One also might argue that because U.S. investors currently can participate
in secondary offshore markets in Category I foreign securities forty days from
the initial offering (at the latest), and perhaps immediately after the offering (if
they are not considered to be in the primary distribution chain), not much is
achieved by permitting them to have access to the initial distribution.  Leaving
aside the substantial uncertainties of who is or is not in the distribution chain,
many investors want the opportunity to buy in the primary markets at a fixed
price.  The availability of such purchasers can be an important factor in setting
the price of the issue, and ultimately determining the global allocation of capi-
tal.  In short, the proposed rule would make a significant difference.
VII
CONCLUSION
This article posits that it would be desirable for issuers in public primary se-
curities markets to be able to issue securities to investors worldwide using one
set of optimal distribution procedures and disclosure documents, and one set of
liability standards and enforcement remedies.  It points out that this state of af-
fairs is currently not possible because the United States conditions public issu-
ance in its territory—and to some significant extent to U.S. investors outside its
territory—on compliance with its unique set of distribution procedures, disclo-
sure requirements, and enforcement rules.  This is not optimal, as reflected in
the different procedures and level of disclosure often used in the unregulated
private placement market.  If one were to use private market disclosure, based
on actual practices, as a basis for determining required public disclosure, the
level of disclosure would depend on the characteristics of the issue and the na-
ture of the issuer much more than at present.  This article rejects, however, the
96. This same perverse logic underlies the U.S. rules remitting trading in the United States of un-
registered foreign securities to the pink sheets.  While it may be harder for the investor to find the pink
sheets, investors who trade through them must suffer the consequences of illiquid markets.  United
States investors would be better off if they could trade all foreign securities in liquid markets, that is,
exchanges.  See FINANCIAL ECONOMISTS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON LISTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR FOREIGN SECURITIES (July 3, 1993).
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contention that disclosure is unimportant to investor welfare because investors
can discount stock prices to compensate for the lack of information; the dis-
counting mechanism simply does not work.
Harmonization of world rules is not the answer to this problem.  There is no
reason to assume that the world would choose an optimal level of disclosure,
particularly because the United States will push for world rules that are closely
equivalent to its own.  Moreover, there is substantial doubt as to whether
worldwide agreement can be reached on the issue of disclosure, let alone distri-
bution and enforcement rules.  Undesirable sacrifices of sovereignty to an
Uber-regulator might be required, and regulatory innovation that grows out of
different approaches by different countries would be lost.
Nor is mutual recognition the answer.  Whatever its theoretical virtues—
which I believe are small—the approach is basically unacceptable to the United
States, which is contemplating abandoning the MJDS for Canada, rather than
expanding it to other jurisdictions.  The approach creates basic inequities for
domestic issuers.  The approach has not even worked in the European Union,
which has supranational institutions, despite much fanfare about the single
passport.  Broader versions of mutual recognition, such as portable reciprocity,
founder on problems of enforcement.
I propose instead the establishment of an offshore free zone.  This would
require that the United States, like other countries, permit its investors to par-
ticipate in the offshore market for primary distributions free of restrictions
other than minimum disclosure requirements.  I am aware of no other G-10
country that attempts to restrict investor access to offshore markets. Indeed,
such restrictions are a type of capital control that the United States generally
opposes.  This proposal would require substantial changes in Regulation S, the
SEC’s Internet Release, and Section 4(3) of the ‘33 Act (at least through revi-
sion of Rule 174).  One major benefit of this approach is that it would permit
the use of common distribution procedures.
In the electronic world of today, the distribution of foreign securities need
not take place in any particular territory; it can be done through computers and
the Internet.  We should not hinder this development.  Instead, we should allow
technology to facilitate more optimal arrangements for the primary sale of such
securities.
